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I. INTRODUCTION 
As is true for many economic phenomena, the nature 
and effects of speculative carryover can be investigated from 
two polar viewpoints: perfect competition and monopoly. The 
competitive speculator does not expect his actions to affect 
current or future prices. He forms expectations about future 
prices on the basis of current and past prices and on possibly 
other information and then acts accordingly. The monopolistic 
speculator understands that his actions affect current and 
future prices--not only because his excess demand is part of 
aggregate excess demand but also because his actions may result 
in altered expectations on the part of other participants in 
the market. 
The latter problem is undoubtedly the more interesting 
one. However it is important that we fully understand the 
competitive case as well. An understanding of the welfare 
properties of the competitive case is necessary for normative 
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discussions concerning what types of behavior we would like to 
encourage when designing institutions. As well, a very inter-
esting situation to analyze theoretically occurs when one or 
more monopolistic speculators operate simultaneously with 
competitive speculators. This "wolves preying on sheep" scenario 
is often thought to occur in the real world. Obviously under-
standing behavior of the sheep in the absence of the wolf is a 
useful first step in the larger problem; it also becomes a base 
case with which to compare further results and from which to 
gain further intuition. 
Very little theoretical research on any aspect of the 
problem exists. A series of early papers [l, 7, 10, 11] consider 
the case where non-speculative excess demand is an affine 
function of current price. They prove that if speculators aper-
ating over some finite period of time earn positive � post profits 
that prices were � post stabilized over that period of time. 
This does not, however, formally justify Milton Friedman's 
famous remark. 
People who argue that speculation is generally destabilizing 
seldom realize that this is largely equivalent to saying that 
speculators lose money, since speculation can be destabilizing 
in general only if speculators on the average sell when the 
currency is low in price and buy when it is high. 1 
A single monopolist speculator with perfect foresight would only 
engage in profitable and thus stabilizing speculation. However, 
speculators who misjudge their competitors' actions or who are 
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not able to perfectly predict some exogenous randomness might 
earn negative ex post profits. These speculators could remain 
in the market over the long term so long as they earned positive 
average profits. Therefore if we want to conclude that speculators 
we are likely to find in a market are stabilizing, we need to 
prove that speculation which yields positive expected profits 
is stabilizing. 
Hart (SJ has recently considered the more general 
case where current excess demand is an affine function of 
current and past prices. This constitutes the first theoretical 
investigation of the "wolf and sheep" case; I will demonstrate 
that this excess demand function could be caused by the behavior 
of competitive speculators using past prices to predict future 
prices. He does not consider welfare properties or price stability; 
rather, he characterizes the cases where the wolf could make 
positive profits. 
Only three papers to my knowledge have explicitly 
considered the case of competitive speculative carryover. Of 
these, only Kohn [8] explicitly calculates and uses optimal behavior 
for the speculators. He is also one of the few researchers to 
depart from the framework of non-speculative excess demand being 
affine. However, he pays a high price; he can only prove a limited 
existence and uniqueness theorem. Futia [3] solely considers the 
extent to which prices convey information in a market with competitive 
speculators where non-speculative excess demand is affine in current 
price. While this is an important problem it is outside the scope of 
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this paper. Finally, Muth [9] considers speculative carryover 
in his paper on rational expectations. He provides a non­
constructive proof that a long run rational expectations equilibrium 
exists and that prices are stabilized at it. However, he uses 
an arbitrary rule for speculators to follow and does not 
explicitly consider their expectations--it is producers operating 
with a one period supply lag whose expectations are considered. 
The approach of this paper is most closely related to 
that of Muth; it represents a full treatment of Muth's case. 
Speculators' expectations and optimal behavior on their part are 
treated explicitly. Equilibrium price paths as well as their 
limit are constructively proven to exist for all expectations 
formation functions (EFF's) affine in current price. The 
relationship between four economic concepts is fully explored 
for the entire class of EFF's. The four concepts are: 
(i) 
(ii) 
Stability: To what extent does the speculator stabilize 
or destabilize prices? 
Profitability: How large are the speculator's average 
profits? 
(iii) Accuracy: How accurate is the speculator's estimate of 
(iv) 
next period's price? 
Responsiveness: How responsive is the speculator's estimate 
of next period's price to changes in this period's price? 
Friedman's assertion is true in a very strong and 
appealing form in this model. A speculator making optimal decisions 
based on a fixed EFF has one of two effects. Either: 
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(1) Speculation does not change average price, reduces variance 
of prices, and results in a positive correlation between 
prices, the correlation becoming smaller as prices move 
further apart. That is, speculation smooths price variation 
around the mean by partially shifting peaks to adjacent 
periods. The speculator may earn negative, zero, or positive 
average profits. 
(2) The speculator exhibits hoarding behavior, resulting in 
hyperinflation and eventual market collapse. Expected 
profits are infinitely negative in the limit. 
That is, a speculator making optimal decisions never can generate 
a finite increase in the variance of prices over the long run; 
he either reduces variance or causes a hyperinflation with infinite 
variance and expected price in the limit. 
This paper also proves that if the speculator has 
rational expectations (that is, if his expectation of next 
period's price is the actual expected value of next period's price) 
that two possible equilibria exist--one of each of the types out-
lined above. The "best" and "worst" consequences of speculative 
behavior emerge as two possible equilibria of the same rational 
expectations model. The stable rational expectations equilibrium 
is the one identified by Muth. 
Stability and profitability are therefore somewhat 
related. However, a speculator earning more profits is not 
necessarily more stabilizing. In this sense of the word 
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"relation "--existence of a monotone relation--profitability, 
stability and correctness are mutually unrelated. Stability 
and responsiveness are monotonely related, however. A more 
responsive speculator always stabilizes prices less. If 
a speculator's expectations are responsive enough, he will 
cause a hyperinflation and destabilize prices. 
II.  THE SPECULATOR 
Assume that the speculator incurs costs in holding 
inventories. To avoid dealing with the boundary condition that 
inventories must be non-negative, also assume that storing inven-
tories yields benefits in addition to those arising from 
1 . . 2 specu at1ve gain. Most papers in the literature simply ignore
this problem (1, 3, 9, 10, 11]. Identifying conditions sufficient 
to ignore the problem is no worse a solution. At least in some 
instances the existence of benefits from holding inventories 
are connnon and unsurprising. Pioneer scholars in the field 
have recognized this point. 
Stocks of all goods possess a yield • • • and this yield 
which is a compensation to the holder of stocks, must be 
deducted from carrying costs proper in calculating net 
carrying cost. The latter can, therefore be negative or 
positive.3
Storage of goods without direct renumeration and 
without expectation of price appreciation is to be observed 
in every retail store. A merchant might adopt the practice 
of buying today only what he could be sure of selling before 
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tomorrow, or before the next delivery day, but if he did so 
he would be unlikely to remain long in business; he must 
carry stocks beyond known innnediate needs and take his return 
. 1 . f . 4in genera customer satis action. 
In terms of our simple model, we might imagine that our speculator 
(who is now also a merchant) is usually faced with a lag in deliveries 
from the producer near the start of each period, and so must have 
extra stocks on hand if he wishes to avoid delays in satisfying 
demand. 
Net costs of inventory holding are then simply costs minus 
benefits. Assume that net costs can be approximated by a quadratic 
function. Let st represent stocks of inventories held over at time t 
5 for time t + 1. Then for some constants b, c, and d we can write 
out net costs of holding st, 
c 2 
2<st - b) 
+ d (1) 
Assume that the speculator pays these costs after the storage has 
been performed (i. e. he pays for holding st during period t + 1). 
Consider the speculator's problem at period t. He 
knows his current inventory, st-l' the current price pt, and 
his expectation of price during periods after t, Et+i for 
i = 1, 2, 3, . . . .  He needs to choose a new inventory level to 
carry over for next period, st. To do this he implicitly also 
selects a plan for future inventory holdings. Let 
{st+i
}
i:;'l 
be this plan where st+i c
an depend upon Pt+i 
and st+i-l • 
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Definition: Let � = {st+i}i:;'O be a set of measurable functions 
whose range is the non-negative real line and whose 
domain is R!. 
Then � is a period t strategy. 
Strategies will be compared by using the overtaking criterion 
on the expected discounted value of profits. Assume that the 
discount factor, S, is between 0 and 1. Let � be a period t 
strategy. Then the discounted expected profits from time t 
to time r asrising from � are 
D(�, r) J r . t ) E
Li
ts i- [pi (si-1 - si - c z-<si-1 - b)2 
Definition: � is an optimal period t strategy if for any 
period t strategy �. there exists an integer 
- d]} . 
r(�) � t such that for every integer j greater 
than r 
D(�, j) � D(�, j). 
(2) 
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Because the speculator is competitive he believes 
his actions do not affect prices--the optimum strategy is simply 
the period by period optimum. That is, the speculator chooses 
st as if he were going out of business at the end of period t + 1.
Kohn [8] discusses the intuition of this result. Note that the 
following proof is more general than his in that it is based on 
the overtaking criterion and can thus handle unbounded returns. 
As well, to use Kohn's dynamic programming approach we must assume 
that the state space of current price and inventories is compact; 
this is not a natural assumption. � priori, inventories or price 
might be arbitrarily large. 
Proposition 1: The unique optimal period t strategy is 
st+i 
Proof: Rewrite D(�,oo) as 
D(�,oo) 
max[O '
Et+i+l + b -
pt
S
+i].c c 
P s _ E-c 2 t t-1 2 st-1 - b) - d
+ l 6i (s.)]. i=t 
where 
( 3) 
tli (si) i-t Be 
2 B [si (Bpi+! - pi) - z-Csi - b) - d] .
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Clearly if we could choose si to uniquely maximize 6i
' it would
be the unique optimal strategy. The only question is whether 
an si chosen in this fashion is only a function of pi and si-l"
Expression ( 3) is the unique maximum to 6i and it is only a
function of pi.
III. THE MODEL WITHOUT SPECULATORS
Let excess demand at time t be given by 
-apt + Yt
D 
(4) 
where a is a positive constant and yt is independently and
identically distributed across time with expected value r and
variance V. Then in the absence of speculation, equilibrium 
price in time t is equal to yt/a. Therefore the expected
value of pt is r/a and the variance of pt is V/a
2. Furthermore
prices are independent across periods. 
IV. LINEAR EXPECTATIONS
Assume that there is one speculator in the market. 
The results are immediately generalizable to case of n identical 
speculators. Assume that the speculator's expectations about 
next period's price are a linear function of last period's price, 
Et 0Pt-1 + £. (5) 
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Also assume that o > O; a larger price generates expectations 
of a larger price. Equation (5) can be rewritten to yield a 
particularly natural interpretation, 
- £ £ Et - � + o (pt-1 - �). (6) 
The speculator generally expects price to be around £/1 - o. If
pt-l is £/1 - o, so is Et. If price in period t - 1 varies from 
£/1 - o, the speculator adds or subtracts o times the difference 
to his estimate. If o is greater than 1, the speculator adds 
more than the difference; his expectation of pt is always further 
from £/1 - o than is pt-l" The speculator is "panicked" in the 
sense that deviations from £/1 - o in pt-l cause even larger 
deviations in his expectations about pt. Such expectations will 
be called responsive. In general, we will call expectations 
using a higher value for o more responsive. 
Substitute (6) into (3) to yield 
st 
0 1 £ max[O, (c - SC) pt + c + b]. 
Equilibrium price at period t is determined by 
-ap + yt +st st-1" 
Substitute from (7) into (8), assuming for the moment that 
(§__ - J:-) pt + � + b is non-negative. This yields c ..,c c 
(7) 
(8) 
Rewrite this as 
where 
§__
l
L 
_§_ - 1\ 
p Pt 
= ( ,c - Be 
c B: - a t-1 
pt = µpt-1 + \)t' 
0 1 s = - - -c Be 
µ =-s -s - a 
-yt v ---
t - s - a 
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-�-
\c Be{ 
a 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
This is a first order difference equation. Its solution is 
pt 
t i t � t- \) + µ p /. µ i 0 i=l 
(14) 
where p0 is the initial value.
6 That is, if at period 0 the 
speculator were using the EFF (5) and we observed p0, then (13) 
would give the price path from that period on if he continued 
to use (5). 
A sufficient condition for (§__ - ! >Pt+�+ b to be c ..,c c 
non-negative, as assumed above, is that s is less than -j or 
bigger than a. In particular, the analysis applies to the 
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case of unresponsive expectations formation mechanisms as well 
as moderately responsive ones. These, perhaps, are economically 
the most plausible cases. We also can analyze wildly responsive 
expectations formation mechanisms--those where s is greater than 
a. For the remainder of the paper we will only be considering
expectations formation mechanisms such that s is less than I
or greater than a. 
To see this, consider the graph of µ as a function of
s in Figure 1. a First suppose that s is less than z· Then µ 
is between 0 and 1 in absolute value. Assume that y is always 
within [O,y*] for some positive real Y*· Then Vt is bounded;
by ClO) pt is also bounded. Consequently, b can be chosen large
0 1 £ enough so that Cc - Bc)pt + c + b is always non-negative.
We will always assume that where s < a/2, b is this large. That 
is, we will always assume that the benefits of holding inventories 
are large enough so that some small amount of inventories will 
always be held. Second consider the case where s is greater 
than a. Then µ is positive so that pt is always positive and
consequently cf - 6
1) p + �+ b is always positive. Thereforec c t c 
the only case where our assumption that cf - 6
1)p + �+ b isc c t c 
non-negative is inconsistent is when I .:::_ s .:::_ a. Here we have 
to consider the possibility of zero inventory carryover. 
If we are interested in economies in which the specu-
later has been using the same EFF for a long time, the starting 
point, p0, is arbitrary. The limit values of price are
independent of p0•
FIGURE l 
µ 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I 
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Proposition 2:
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
lim E(pt)t-><x> 
lim Var(pt)
t->-OO 
{t[µ[<l+ oo, µ > 1 
{ __'!__(�)· [µ/a2 \a - 2E; /  /00 
n 
Cov(pt,pt+n) = µ V(pt)
< 1 
> 1 
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Proof: I will present the proofs for /µ/ < 1. The other case
(i) 
should be clear. 
lim E(pt)
t-+«> 
( 
t t-i t �
lim E . I µ vi + µ P0 
t-+«> i=l 
00 
-r I µi 
a i=O 
= {% - s
1
c)-
-r 1 
- \% - s
1
c) - a 1 -
µ 
= -r 
Ii l\ 
�- ·�� \ c Sc/ - a -a 
r = -a 
(ii) 
(iii) 
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lim Var(p ) = lim Var I µ v. + µ Po [ t t-i t Jt-><x> t t->-OO i=l ]_ 
Cov(pt,Pt+n) 
v 
(%-- Slc - a) :'. 
\' 2·l µ ]_ 
i=O 
v 1 
(i - _!_ - a)2 0 1 - /c Sc 
v 
• (% - jc - a) 2(i _ _!_ _ a\ 2 (i _ _!_ _ a)2 _ (i _ _!_\2 c Sc / c Sc c Sc/ 
v 
-2a(i - _!_\ + a2c sc; 
v =----z 
a a -
a 
2(% - s
1
c) 
[ � t-i t ttn ( t+n-i) t+n JCov . l µ vi + µ Po, . l µ v 1 + µ Po i=l i=l 
= .I (µ2 <
t-i)+nVar(vi)\ 
i=l \' J 
= µ
nVar( I µ(t-i)v.)
i=l ]_ 
n 
= p Var(pt).
D 
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Therefore when the speculator exhibits an unresponsive 
expectations formation mechanism, the variance of prices is 
reduced about the same mean by smoothing between periods. This 
results in a positive correlation between prices. All these 
effects become less pronounced, the more responsive is the expec-
tations formations mechanism. These effects even continue 
when the expectations formations process is somewhat responsive. 
However, if the process becomes responsive enough, expected 
price goes to infinity. Essentially, observation of a high 
price triggers inventory holding which raises prices which 
generates further hoarding etc. The process continues until 
the market collaspses or, more likely, until speculators 
change their method of expectations formation. 
Four remarks are in order. First, Var(pt) converges 
upwards to its limit. Therefore introduction of a speculator 
results in a reduced variance in the short as well as the long 
run when JµJ < 1. 
Second, part (iii) of Proposition 2 constitutes a test-
able hypothesis which might be used to test the theory's applic-
ability to individual markets. That is, we can check if a number µ 
exists such that the theory is applicable to that market. Note that 
the entire theory could be translated into terms of log linearity 
if this was thought to be more appropriate for econometric purposes. 
Third, the numerical value of E does not affect the 
conclusions of Theorem 1. A higher E only means that inventories 
are perpetually higher by E/c. This feature is a result of the 
quadratic cost function. 
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Fourth, the simplest case of linear expectations 
is constant expectations--where o is O. This is of course an 
unresponsive expectations function so all the comments 
concerning unresponsive expectations formation functions apply 
to the case where speculators always expect price to be a given 
constant. 
V. RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS 
One might expect that if speculators really used a 
constant expectation that over the long run E would become f/a 
which is the unconditional expected value of price. In the 
class of constant expectations E = f/a is certainly the best 
choice.7 However, the speculator is not limited to forming 
the same expectation period after period. In particular, the 
speculator can use current and past information to help 
predict next period's price. The speculator should only be 
satisfied with his method of prediction if his guess is the 
best possible using all past information. That is, it should 
be true that 
Et 
}t-1 { }t-1 E(pt/{pi i=O' Yi i=l).
An EFF which produces this result is said to be rational, 
(15) 
and the market is then said to be in a rational expectations 
equilibrium. This is also Muth's (9] and Kahn's [8] rational 
definition of rational expectations. 
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In the class of expectations of the form 
Et 
cSpt-1 + €
there turn out to be precisely two choices for (cS,�) which 
yield rational expectations equilibria. To see this, sub-
stitute (5) and (9) into (15) to yield 
6 1 
c - sc ___ r_�--6 Pt-1 + € = (0§_ _ ___!_) _ a pt-1 - (� _ ___!_)·- a
c Sc ': Sc 
(16) 
( 17) 
Since this is an indentity (i.e. it is true for every value of 
Pt-l) we have 
cS 
cS 1 
c - Be 
�% - tc) - a
-r -€ = (� - Slc) - a
Diagranunatically, view the RHS of (18) as a function of cS,
G(cS) 
cS 1 
-C - Sc
Ti� - a  \c Sc/ 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
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The function G is a hyperbola (see Figure 2). The two solutions 
to G(o) = o are the two points of intersection of the hyperbolas
with the 45° line. Each intersects once. Note that the inter-
section with the upper hyperbola occurs at a value of o greater 
than i + ac. It can also be shown that the intersection with 
the lower hyperbola occurs at a value less than aBc
l
+ 1 (which
is in particular less than one). We will use the notation o1
and £1 and OU and £U for the values associated with the lower 
and upper intersections. 
Proposition 3: 
0 < 
1 
1 aBc + 1 · 
Proof: It is clearly sufficient to prove that G(_n_1, , ) < � . • •  
We will now do this. 
c(aBc \ i) 
-1 1 -
2
--+ -
aBc + c Be 
a +  - -( 1 1 ) 
Be aBc2 + c 
-Be + aBc2 + c
2 2 a(aBc + c)Bc - Be + aBc + c 
1 
1 + 
2 aBc (aBc + 1)
2 
aBc + c(l - B) 
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1 
---aBc + 1 ] 1 + aBc [aBc + 1 - B 
1 
< 1+ aBc 
D 
Therefore the expectations formation function using 
(01,£1) is unresponsive and possesses all the properties of 
an unresponsive EFF discussed in section IV. The second rational 
EFF characterized by (ou,£u) is sufficiently responsive so that 
expected price and variance converge to infinity. That is, 
it is an example of self-fulfilling hoarding psychology 
producing a hyperinflation. 
VI. UPDATING THE EFF
Aside from two problems "traditional" to the literature--
linearity and negative inventories--the major weakness of this 
paper is probably the assumption that the speculator uses a 
fixed EFF. We might actually expect him to be constantly 
revising his EFF in the light of new information. The entire 
time path is calculated in the previous sections but the results 
following this section will only apply to a long run equilib-
rium situation. 
The notion of rational expectations is of course 
meant to finesse this problem; there is no need for the speculator 
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to revise his EFF when he is already using the "best" method 
available. However, the unstable rational expectations equilib-
rium seems unlikely to be long-lasting under a "reasonable" 
updating scheme. Presumably speculators would originally be 
quite happy with their use of the numbers (oU,EU) because their 
predictions would be on average correct. However as they began 
to notice that the large price rises were associated with 
equally large inventory buildups, they might use this infer-
mation to revise their expectations downward and the "bubble" 
would burst. That is, the existence of a self-fulfilling 
hoarding psychology might tend to produce price bubbles in 
markets. Bubbles might occur when speculators were in the 
unstable rational expectations equilibrium and last until 
information about inventory buildups caused a downward revision 
in expectations. Conjectures such as this point out the 
need for an explicit treatment of the updating process. 
VII. ACCURACY
We can use the limit as t goes to infinity of the 
variance of Et around the conditional expected value of pt as a 
measure of how accurate the speculator's expectations are. A lower 
value indicates a more accurate method of forming expectations. 
A rational expectations formation function of course has a 
value of 0 by definition. Accuracy is independent of stabil-
ization even within the class of stable EFF's. That is, a 
more accurate method of forming expectations is not necessarily 
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always more or less stabilizing than a less accurate method. EFF's 
become more stabilizing as o becomes smaller independent of £; 
they become more accurate (at least locally) as o approaches oL 
(letting Ebe -r/� - a). Therefore we cannot use the accuracy of 
a speculator's expectations to infer anything about his stabilizing 
influence or vice versa. 
VIII. PROFITABILITY
The speculator's profits for period t are calculated 
as follows. 
7Tt 
c 2 ptst-1 - ptst - 2<st-l - b) 
- d (21)
That is, at time t he sells st-l' earning ptst-l' He buys st 
at a cost of ptst and also pays his bill of �(st-l - b)2 + d for
the holding of st-l' If the speculator forms expectations about 
next period's price via the rule (5) we saw that price converges 
towards the random variable with expected value and variance 
given in Proposition 2. We can calculate the value towards 
which expected prof its converge by using this information. 
The case where lµI > 1 should be clearest. Here 
expected price, variance and expected inventory carryover all 
converge to infinity. Since the speculator increases his inven-
tories on average every period, expected profits converge to minus 
infinity. The formal argument will not be presented for this 
case. It is easy to derive. This leaves the case of lµI < 1. 
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Proposition 4: Suppose the speculator forms expectations via 
equation (4). Let lµI < 1. Then 
lim E (n ) 
t�>= t [za(a - z�f (E: - a)] [za - ct, ([, - a)] V 
2 2 - .£!i_ r2 - c[,£ r - £s. - d
2a2 aB 282 
(22) 
Proof: We will calculate expected profits in two pieces. Part 
I will calculate expected prof its excluding inventory holding
costs. Part II will calculate expected inventory holding costs. 
Part I: First calculate the expected value.
E [ptSt-1 - ptSt]
E[pt (St-1 
- St)]
E - E p - p 
E[ ( t 
t+l + t t-1)] b (J)Pt c Be y 
E[pt (pt-1 - pt)[,] by (5)
[,[Cov(pt-l'pt) - Var (pt_1)].
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Now we use Proposition 2 to calculate the limit of the expected value. 
lim E[p S l - p S ]t->oo t t- t t 
[, (µ - 1) v a (a - 2[,) 
[, v ([, - a) (a - 2[,) 
• 
Note that the above is always non-negative. That is, before 
inventory holding costs, the speculator always makes a profit 
regardless of his expectations. 
Part II: First calculate the expected value. 
[c 2 E z-Cst - b) ]
E p 
E [.£_ ( t+l - _!_)2] by (3) 2 B Be 
c £ 2 Elz-CE,pt + S) l by (5)
2 
= .£.cZ (V ( ) + E (  ) 2) + c[,£ E (  ) + � + d2"' ar Pt Pt 8 pt 2 28 
Now we use Theorem 1 to calculate the limit of the expected value. 
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lim E[fcst - b)
2J
t->oo 
2 2 2 cs v + ES_ r2 + cs£ r + � + d2a (a - 20 2a2 Ba 26 2 
The total can now be had by subtracting Part II from Part I. 
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The above expression gives expected profits as a function 
of the pair (o,c) used by the speculator in forming expectations. 
It turns out that to answer the questions we are interested in, 
it is sufficient to consider the function giving maximum expected 
profits for the number o (the maximum being taken over all
possible values for c). This has a simpler functional form. 
Corollary 1: 
m�x !-!: E ('Tft) s 2a (a - 2s)(s - a)(2a - cs(s - a)]V - d (23) 
Proof: Simply calculate the first order conditions. This yields 
c = -frr. (24) a 
Substitute this into the expected profits function. 
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It will be useful for the ensuing discussion to keep 
the following graphical interpretation in mind. Since s is a 
simple linear function of o ,  we can easily view (22) and (23)
as functions of s instead of o.  This turns out to be more
convenient. We will write (23) as 
f(O g (Oh (OV - d 
where 
g(O 
s 
2a (a - 2s)(s - a) 
and 
h(s) 2a - cs(s - a). 
It should be clear from Figure 3 that expected 
profits net of the fixed cost or benefit of d are positive 
(25) 
(26) 
(2 7) 
if and only if s* < s < 0. Furthermore since g and h are both 
continuous, a point of maximum expected profits actually exists 
somewhere on the interval (s*,O). In particular, the point of 
maximum expected profits occurs at an unresponsive EFF. 
Three points can now be made on the basis of this 
analysis. First, within the context of this model, Friedman's 
assertion is correct. Speculation which yields non-negative 
expected profits in the long run is stabilizing. If the 
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speculator is earning non-negative expected profits, we must 
have \µ\ < 1 or else expected profits would be infinitely
negative. Friedman's assertion is true in an even stronger and 
more appealing form in this model. A speculator making optimal 
decisions based upon linear expectations in a linear model 
always has one of two effects. Either 
(i) he stabilizes prices and may earn negative zero or 
positive expected profits. 
(ii) he causes a hyperinflation and earns infinite negative 
profits in the limit. 
That is, a speculator making optimal decisions in our model 
never can generate a finite increase in the variance of 
prices in the long run; he either reduces variance or causes 
a hyperinflation. 
Second, expected profitability is not monotonely 
related to stabilizing effect. That is, a speculator earning 
more profits is not necessarily more stabilizing. The existence 
of positive profits implies that the speculator is stabilizing, 
but no further relation exists. To see this it is sufficient 
to prove that the point of maximum profits does not necessarily 
coincide with the point of maximum stabilizing influence. 
Corollary 2 :  The value of� generating maximum expected profits 
is not necessarily equal to - ;B which is the value of �
generating maximum stability. 
Figure 3 
h (O 
g (O 
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Proof: It is sufficient to show that a case exists where 
s* > - _!_B because then the value of s generating maximum- c 
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expected profits is definitely larger than - c� · The number
s* is the solution of h(s) = 0 A s < 0. From Figure 3, it 
is sufficient to identify a case where 
Now 
1h<- cs)
1 h(- cB) < o 
1 1 2a - -(-+ a)B cB 
Since B < 1 , it is clear that c < _!_ implies that h(- 1B) < 0.a c 
D 
The third point is once again in a negative vein. 
We might expect that expectations which are more accurate8
would generate higher expected profits. This turns out to be 
untrue.9 A speculator whose expectations are more correct
might actually earn smaller average profits. This seemingly 
nonintuitive result is explained by realizing that the specu-
lator is perfectly competitive; he acts on the false assumption 
that his actions do not affect price. Given this false 
assumption, it is not so surprising that coupling it with 
another false assumption may yield better results than coupling 
it with a correct assumption. To prove this assertion, it is
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clearly sufficient to show that cases exist where the stable 
rational expectations equilibrium is not the point of maximum 
expected profits. 
Corollary 3: The stable rational expectations equilibrium is 
not necessarily the point of maximum prof its. 
Proof: The strategy of the proof will be to assume we have 
a point s** which is associated with a rational expectations 
equilibrium and which is a point of maximum profits. We then 
derive the contradiction for a particular case, that s** � s*·
Since s** is a rational expectations equilibrium it satisfies 
(19). Since it is a point of maximum profits it satisfies (24). 
Putting these together, s** must satisfy 
a <s- a)s = s· (28) 
c Suppose that B = z-· Then h(s) 0, the equation defining s*,
becomes 
a (s - a) s  = s· (29) 
Therefore s** s* which contradicts s** generating maximum 
profits. 
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VII. CONCLUSION
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Within the context of our model speculation which on 
average yields non-negative profits is stabilizing. In fact, a 
speculator making optimal decisions with a given method of 
forming expectations can never generate a finite increase in 
the variance of prices in the long run; he either reduces variance 
or causes a hyperinflation exhibiting infinite variance and 
negative infinite profits in the limit. A rational expectations 
equilibrium of each type exists. Profitability, stability and 
correctness are mutually unrelated in any monotone fashion. 
However a more responsive speculator always stabilizes prices 
less. If a speculator's expectations are responsive enough, 
he will cause a hyperinflation and destabilize prices. 
The need to relax the linearity assumptions, to 
endogenize the choice of the EFF, and to deal more effectively 
with the non-negative inventories constraint has already 
been commented on. One other obvious direction for research 
concerns allowing two or more speculators using different EFF's. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
34 
FOOTNOTES 
Friedman [2]. 
Essentially, we will assume that benefits are large enough 
to guarantee that some inventories will always be held. 
See section IV. 
Kaldor [6]. 
Working [ 12] . 
The subscript t will always denote the value of the variable 
during period t. 
See Goldberg [4] for a treatment of this type of difference 
equation. 
7. As will be seen in section VI, it is the best not only in
the sense that it is correct but it also maximizes profits
among the class of expectations formation mechanisms of
the form E = £,t 
8. Recall the definition of accurate is given in section VII.
35 
9. This is trivially true if we allow expectations which 
generate hyperinflations. The content of this theorem 
is that it is also true within the class of stabilizing 
expectations. 
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